Government Subsidy Strategies in Blockchain-Enabled Dual-Channel Green Supply Chains
Jianhua Wang, Wenxin Zhang
Article
2026 / Volume 9 / Pages 3257-3280
Published 25 April 2026
Abstract
To promote the high-quality development of green supply chains, this study considers government investment subsidies for blockchain technology and incorporates blockchain influence and blockchain service commission mechanism into the analysis. Particularly in the textile industry, the traceability of green fibers and carbon footprints has become a core concern for supply chain management. A Stackelberg game model is developed in which the government acts as the leader, followed by a manufacturer and a retailer, to examine the impacts of different government subsidy strategies. The results show that green technology subsidies can effectively enhance product greenness and market demand, increase the profits of supply chain members, and improve overall social welfare. Further analysis indicates that, under the same total government subsidy expenditure, green technology subsidies are more effective in improving product greenness, environmental benefits, and social welfare, whereas price subsidies are more conducive to expanding sales volume and increasing the profits of supply chain members as well as consumer surplus.
Keywords
blockchain, government subsidy strategy, textile supply chain, social welfare, dual channels